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Two Pauline doxologies, laden with the freshness and purity of a divine atmos-
phere, set the theme of this work. Ephesians 3:2 I reads, "Unto him be glory in the 
Church by Jesus Christ throughout all ages, world without end. Amen." Galatians 
I :5, voicing a similar thought, reads, 'To whom be glory for ever and ever. Amen." 
Their beauty and eloquence in the King James Version are unexcelled. 
However, the English translation of the original Greek does not disclose the full 
import of the passages. The literal translation of the phrase in Ephesians 3 :21 , 
"throughout all ages, world without end," is, in the original Greek, d~ 1t<icra~ 'ta.~ 
y£v£a.~ 'tou airovo~ 't rov aiwvO)v, "unto all generations of the age of the ages." The 
relevant phrase in Galatians 1:5, "for ever and ever," £i~ 'tou~ airova~ 'trov 
aiwvO)v, unto the ages of the ages. 
Ephesians 3 :2 I carries the thought that the generations of the redeemed, those 
who even in this time-bound life become the "children of the resurrection," are pre-
served in the final Age, the Age that embraces, without loss, all time-bound ages. 
There is, then, the Age of the ages. 
Now Galatians 1:5 plays on the plural, ages, and replicates the plural, so as to 
emphasize the eternity in which the long stream of historical ages is comprehended 
and finally saved. The eternity of the New Testament is not a static age, but rather is 
the dynamic of an endlessness, the constituents of which are the innumerable series 
of the ages of time. 
These passages, then, address the question of time and eternity and their relation 
to each other. We shall see that this New Testament view differs widely from 
human speculation and brings time and eternity together in salvational harmony. 
In order to pursue this subject, it is necessary to come to some understanding of 
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the meaning of the crucial terms, time and eternity. Attention will be given to certain writ-
ers, historical and modem, so as to throw light on the subject under consideration. 
The question of the nature of time is a very complex and difficult one. St. Augustine 
(A.D. 354-430) put the matter very well: "What, then, is time? If no one asks of me, I 
know; if I wish to explain to him who asks, I know not."] There is a very good reason 
why Augustine knows what time is but finds himself unable to explain its nature. First and 
foremost, time is directly exhibited in awareness. But, secondly, like everything so exhibited, 
it is therefore indefinable. 
Now, the question emerges as to whether or not there is a "real" time in nature. That 
is, does the moving flow of experienced time have some counterpart in nature? As we 
shall see, attempts to establish the reality of objective time all too often proceed on the 
assumption of a logical-mathematical paradigm of a time-series of instant-less points. But, 
as we shall also indicate, this leads to insuperable difficulties. A few examples of the diffi-
culties may be briefly noted. 
The early Creek philosopher Zeno of Elea {cire. 490-430 B.C,} argued that, if time is 
composed of indivisible instants, motion is impossible. The argument is that of the "para-
dox of the flying arrow." In a temporal instant, he says, no change of position can occur. 
Hence, motion, which requires that a body change position, cannot occur, albeit, paradox-
ically, motion does appear to occur. 
If it is incorrect to reify, i.e., apply to reality, a mathematically conceived time-series of 
temporal instants, it is also incorrect to reify the past and the future. This reification lies at 
the root of Augustine's dilemma concerning the reality of the past and the future. Having 
confessed that, while he knows what time is, although he cannot explain it, he writes: 
Yet I say with confidence, that I know that if nothing passed away, there would not 
be past time; and if nothing were coming. there would not be future time; and if 
nothing were, there would not be present time. Those two times, therefore, past and 
future, how are they, when even the past now is not, and the future is not as yet.2 
Essentially the same problem occurs with respect to a "real" present. There is a real 
present only on condition that the present cease to be, that it become non-existent: 
But should the present be always present, and should it not pass into time past, 
truly it could not be time, but eternity. If, then, time present- if it be time-only 
comes into existence because it passes into time past, how do we say that even this 
is, whose cause of being is that it shall not be-namely, so that we cannot truly say 
that time is, unless because it tends not to be?3 
It may be, and has been, said that there is in nature an "absolute" time and that, 
accordingly, the past and the future are accommodated in this order of time. This is the 
position of Newton (1642-1727): 
Absolute, true, mathematical time, of itself, and from its own nature, flows equably 
without relation to anything external, and by another name is called duration .... 4 
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The main difficulty with this view is that we have no evidence for the truth of the the-
ory. We are unaware, either directly or indirectly, of absolute time. Newton himself in 
effect admits this. He argues that as improvements are made in the measurement of rela-
tive, common time, a closer approximation to absolute time will be achieved. But there is 
no evidence that these measurements do indeed tend to approximate absolute time. And 
they certainly do not yield any direct awareness of absolute time intervals. 
A more contemporary argument against an objective time is proposed by j. M. E. 
McTaggart (1866-1925). He says that there are two time-series. The A-series is time 
ordered as past, present, and future. This is dynamic time, or time as passage. The B-series 
is time ordered according to the relation of before and after. In this series, time is static, in 
that these relations are permanent. The B-series depends on the A-series.5 
Now, McTaggart continues, the A-series, which is time as experienced, is not objective-
ly real, and this for the reason that its reality implies a contradiction, as well as an infinite 
regress. We experience time, he points out, as presentness (present perception), as past-
ness (memory), and as futurity (anticipation). When these distinctions in the A-series are 
reified, a contradiction results. Every event now assumes the property of present, past, 
and future. Since, however, these characteristics are incompatible, there is no way of rec-
onciling them in an objective time series. 
Past, present, and future are incompatible determinations. Every event must be 
one or the other, but no event can be more than one. If I say that any event is past, 
that implies that it is neither present nor future, and so with the others. And this 
exclusiveness is essential to change, and therefore to time. For the only change we 
can get is from future to present, and present to past. 
The characteristics, therefore, are incompatible. But every event has them all. 
The reality of the A series, then, leads to a contradiction.6 
C. D. Broad (1887-1971) rebuts McTaggart's argument, by pointing out that when a 
complete description of an event is given, which requires the use of tense language, the 
contradiction disappears.? However, we shall not here consider Broad's argument in detail. 
Instead, we shall explore another feature of McTaggart's view. 
He appears to restrict the experience of time to present perception, memory, and 
anticipation. However, memory and anticipation are not in themselves the experience, or 
awareness, of lived time. They therefore are not on the same level with the experience of 
the present. What is remembered is not an actual event or a quale, the pas~ in which the 
event is allegedly located, but rather an experience, the residual traces of which are pre-
sent in the nervous system. Mutatis mutandis, this consideration holds for anticipation. 
Now, if the experienced present is taken as a durationless moment (analogous to the 
dimensionless point of geometry), past and future are completely disassociated from the 
present. They then must be experienced as distinct from the present, apprehended only 
in memory and anticipation. 
However, our awareness of time is that of a specious present. The true present of 
experience is not a durationless moment of time sharply dividing past from future and 
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utterly distinct from both. On the contrary, the experienced present is also the awareness 
of past and future. 
As given in awareness, time is disclosed as an experience of a present that shades off in 
two dimensions: towards an horizon of an immediate "retention" of the past and an 
immediate "protention" of the future. Thus, in experience, past and future are elements of 
the immediately experienced present. They must thus be distinguished from the past as 
recalled in memory and the future as anticipated in expectation. 
The experience of time, then, has a certain "thickness," which shades off into the now-
experience of pastness and futurity. The "now" of experience is not a "knife-edge" experi-
ence. Here there is no instant-less moment of time. Further, an abstract time-series, con-
structed mathematically as a series of instantaneous points, is in nowise the time-flow of 
experience. It is purely and simply a conceptual construct and is abstract throughout. 
Attempts to explain, or define, time in this manner do not reach the time that we actually 
experience and live through. 
Thus past and future need not be placed outside the experience of the present, as 
something "out there" in reality that may be recalled in memory or anticipated in expecta-
tion. Augustine's difficulty conceming the reality of past and future that yet do not exist, 
or McTaggart's difficulty conceming the reality of past and future as concurrent with the 
present, do not appear when past and present are held within the experienced present. 
To conclude this phase of the discussion, some attention may be given to the English-
American philosopher, Alfred North Whitehead (I 861 -1947). His view of time, as set 
forth in chapter three of The Concept of Nature, is helpful. 
Time is not a series of extensionless instants. There are no such instants or series of 
such instants, in either experience or nature. Temporal instants, and their placement in a 
series, are constructions of thought. The awareness of time is the awareness of a "dura-
tion," not of a duration less moment of time. What is posited in sense awareness as a fact 
in nature is not a material object located in "a one-dimensional series of extensional 
instants of time," but an event in process of completing itself. In so far as time is objective, 
it is the duration required for that completion8 
While a moment has no temporal extension, a duration does. Since it is not a concep-
tual abstraction, a duration is directly given in sense-awareness. In contrast to a moment, it 
has what Whitehead calls "temporal thickness": 
. .. the ultimate terminus of awareness is a duration with temporal thickness. This 
immediate duration is not clearly marked out for our apprehension. Its earlier 
boundary is blurred by a fading into memory and its later boundary is blurred by an 
emergence from anticipation. There is no sharp distinction between memory and 
the present immediacy or between the present immediacy and anticipation. The 
present is a wavering breadth of boundary between the two extremes.9 
Since the immediate duration is temporally thick, there is no minimum of duration, a 
point, that defines the present. Further, durations themselves overlap one another. This 
means, then, that for even the individual, the present cannot be definitively determined. 
This holds, mutatis mutandis, for a plurality of minds. Finally, since a mathematically con-
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ceived time-series of points is an abstraction, no such time-series defines an absolute 
world-time. There is no absolute time, either in the passage of mind or the passage of 
nature. On the contrary, there are times. Time, in mind and nature, is relative.1O 
The approach to the question of the nature of time must be a phenomenologiml one. A 
phenomenological consideration of time does two things: (I) it refuses initially to postu-
late an objective world-time, and (2) it insists that time be viewed as directly evident in 
awareness. As thus viewed, time is a process in which durations fade off to past and 
future and overlap each other. 
The language in which the experience of time as duration that includes retention of 
the past and protention of the future is taken from Edmund Husserl (1859-1938). This 
view of time is developed in his 1928 work, Vorlesungen zur Phiinomenologie des inneren 
Zeitbewusstseins, which has been translated by James S. Churchill as The Phenomenology of 
internal Time-Consciousness. The only time of which there is certainty is immanent time. 
When we speak of the analysis of time-consciousness, of the temporal character 
of objects of perception, memory, and expectation, it may seem, to be sure, as if we 
assume the Objective flow of time, and then really study only the subjective condi-
tions of the possibility of an intuition of time and a true knowledge of time. What 
we accept, however, is not the existence of a world-time, the existence of a con-
crete duration, and the like, but time and duration appearing as such. These, how-
ever, are absolute data, which it would be senseless to call in question. To be sure, 
we also assume an existing time; this, however, is not the time of the world of 
experience but the immanent time of the flow of consciousness. I I 
Time, then, is the flow of consciousness, the sense of inner passage. This passage is 
articulated as present duration retaining, containing in presentness, past and future as a 
"shading-off." Husserl describes the retention of the past in present experience: 
We now ... take the sound [a tone] purely as a hyletic datum. [t begins and 
stops, and the whole unity of its duration, the whole unity of the process in which it 
begins and ends, "proceeds" to the end in the ever more distant past. [n this sinking 
back, I still "hold" it fast, have it in a "retention," and as long as the sound persists 
the sound has its own temporality. It is the same and its duration is the same. 12 
The greater portion of The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness deals with the 
relation of present and past, i.e., with presence and retention. Yet Husserl indicates that 
protention belongs to the experience of the present, as well as does retention. He states: 
It pertains to the essence of the expected that it is an about-to-be-perceived. . . . 
expectational intuition is something primordial and unique exactly as is intuition of 
the past. i3 
Husserl's earlier work, Ideen zu einer reinen Phiinomen%gie und phiinomenologischen 
Philosoph ie, appeared in 1913 . The English translation of the first part of the work 
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appeared in 1928, under the title, Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology. The 
term constitution appears there for the first time in Husserl's writings.14 Although he does 
not define the term, the context indicates that it refers to the way in which a presentation-
al content is built up out of many layers of sense qualia. The synthesis that is produced is, 
at this stage in Husserl's thought, a passive one. He became increasingly disturbed by the 
concept of a passive constitution of the object, because it suggested that the construction 
was from the side of the object rather than from the side of the apprehending conscious-
ness. Were this the case, the very foundations of phenomenology, which restricts itself to 
appearances, would be threatened by an unwelcome "realism." At this juncture, he 
tumed to the problem of the awareness of time. He believed that the constitution of the 
inner consciousness of time was the key to all other processes of constitution, the consti-
tution of hyletic data and other objectivities. He apparently suggested that the inner 
stream of time-consciousness, which is operative in other syntheses, is itself produced 
from a deeper source, from a primal source of active synthesis. Such a source, lying below 
time-consciousness itself, would be the transcendental ego. It would be the ultimate root 
of all processes of constitution. 
Now, however it is to be explained, there is, in some sense, a "common world" 
brought to view in human awareness. If there be an ultimate root of active synthesis, it 
cannot be confined to any individual experience. That would issue in solipsism, which is 
an outcome very few would tolerate. What this means is that Husserl's transcendental 
subjectivity must, finally, be extended beyond the individual to a more comprehensive 
experience. The possibility here intimated is what Whitehead suggests as but a conjecture, 
namely, that "this alliance of the passage of mind with the passage of nature arises from 
their both sharing in some ultimate character of passage which dominates all being."ls 
To sum up thus far: What we can say about time is that it is a form of awareness. In 
that awareness, the present embraces past and future. We cannot, by extrapolation or 
abstraction, construct a mathematical time-series, in which past, present, and future are 
located, and regard it as definitive of objective time. Yet time, as the form of awareness, 
must extend beyond any individual awareness. For this consequence, where shall we look? 
In philosophical literature, the term eternity is used in three main senses: as an unend-
ing expanse of time, as absolute timelessness, and as that which includes time, but also 
transcends time. 
The first theory, that etemity is endless time, is the popular view. It is also Kant's view. 
Kant says that the supreme human good consists in conformity with the moral law. This 
moral ideal cannot, he continues, be realized in this life. Thus an endless process is neces-
sary for the attainment of the moral ideal. 
Now, the perfect accordance of the will with the moral law is holiness, a perfec-
tion of which no rational being of the sensible world is capable at any moment of 
his existence. Since, nevertheless, it is required as practically necessary, it can only 
be found in a progress in infinitum towards that perfect accordance, and on the prin-
ciple of pure practical reason it is necessary to assume such a practical progress as 
the real object of our will. 
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Now, this endless progress is only possible on the supposition of an endless dura-
tion of the existence and personality of the same rational being (which is called the 
immortality of the SOUO.16 
However, that there is such an unending expanse of time cannot be demonstrated by 
the theoretical reason. And, to make matters worse, the notion is inconceivable.17 Kant 
regards the time-series as one in which the antecedent parts cease to exist as the succeed-
ing parts come into existence. Now, he continues, the time-order presupposes either a 
first member in the series or an unending succession of antecedent members. Neither 
alternative is conceivable. A first member in the series would have no antecedent mem-
ber to determine its place in the time-order. Its antecedent would be but an empty time, 
which is nothing at all. If there were no first member in the unending series, then the 
series is one which never began-which would be a series that never existed at all. Thus, 
to take Kant's argument, eternity as endless time is an impossibility. 
The difficulties in the idea of an unending process have led the majority of philosophical 
thinkers to regard eternity as a state of existence independent of temporal conditions. The 
apparent timelessness of the "laws" and other general statements of scientific and philosoph-
ic discourse serve to occasion the belief in a corresponding timeless existence. However, our 
ordinary experience appears, at least on the surface, as time-bound, so as to appear to 
exclude any consciousness of timeless existence. Thus, if there is an eternity of timeless exis-
tence, it seems that it has no connection with our temporal mode of existence. The two 
modes of existence-time and eternity-stand in complete separation and opposition. 
At the dawn of western philosophical thought, the Greek philosopher Parmenides of 
Elea (6th-5th century B.C.) argued that the only existent is the one, eternal Being. 
Becoming and change are illusory. If anything comes into existence, it derives from either 
Being or Not-Being. If it comes out of the former, then it already exists and thus does not 
come to be. If it comes out of Not-Being, it is non-existent, since from nothing, nothing 
can come. Hence the appearing world of change is illusory . 
. . . And it [Being) never Was, nor Will Be, because it Is now, a Whole all together, 
One, continuous; for what creation of it will you look for? How, whence (could it 
have) sprung? Nor shall I allow you to speak or think of it as springing from Not-
Being; for it is neither expressible nor thinkable that What-Is-Not Is.18 
The closing portion of Parmenides' poem is entitled 'The Way of Opinion." Here he 
argues that the temporal world of sense appearances is illusory. However, he does not 
attempt to explain why the senses delude us and give rise to false appearances. 
Plato (428-7-348-7 B.C.) recognized the necessity of giving an account of time as well 
as of eternity. The eternally Real is, as it was for Parmenides, available only to thought. 
The Eternal is the Idea of the Good (iji8£u 'tOU ayu90U). It is the supreme reality, the 
wholly other, transcendent in eternal self-subsistence. " ... the good itself is not essence 
but still transcends essence in dignity and surpassing power."19 
In distinction to Parmenides, Plato holds that the visible world of time, of change and 
multiplicity, is not an illusory world. It has some degree of reality. It is, as he calls it, the 
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world of becoming. It therefore must be accounted for. 
There is some sense, Plato argues, in which the Good is the cause of the world. In 
Republic vii 5l 7b-c he says: 
... the idea of the good . . . is indeed the cause for all things of all that is right and 
beautiful, giving birth in the visible world to light .... 
And in Phaedo 99c, he designates the Good as that " .. . which must embrace and hold 
together all things."2o 
There is, however, no conceptual, or scientific, way to define the respect in which the 
Good is the cause of the temporal world. Yet, some account must be given, to indicate in 
some fashion the incontrovertible truth that the Good is the cause of the world. To provide 
the account, Plato turns to the myth. 
The Timaeus tells of the creator-god (811I.1tOupy6~, demiurge) who fashions the 
ordered universe by imposing the eternal forms up on the chaos of matter. He desired to 
make it as nearly like its eternal model as possible. The likeness is but approximate, since 
the world is a sensible world and nothing sensible can be eternal. To effect this approxi-
mation of the world to the eternal, the demiurge created time, which is the mediating link 
between the eternal model and the ordered universe of physical reality. And time is able 
to fulfill this mediating function because it is an image of eternity. But, unlike the eternal, 
which abides the same forever, time is a moving image: 
Accordingly, seeing that that Model is an eternal Living Creature, He set about 
making this Universe, so far as He could, of a like kind. But inasmuch as the nature 
of the Living Creature was eternal, this quality it was impossible to attach in its 
entirety to what is generated; wherefore He planned to make a movable image of 
Eternity, and, as He set in order the Heaven, of that Eternity which abides in unity 
He made an eternal image, moving according to number, even that which we have 
named Time.21 
Time, then, is the moving image of eternity. It is such an image because its movement 
is circular. A temporal movement that repeats itself in its circular process is "like" the eter-
nity "which abides [forever] in unity." 
Yet there is still the unbridgeable disjunction between eternity and time. The distance 
is absolute. The eternal is alone in self-existent isolation, while the temporal is but a shad-
owy image severed completely from the eternal. In no sense does eternity include time. 
It must be observed, parenthetically, that this Platonic view of eternity became the 
dominant view in subsequent western philosophy: from Aristotle onwards through 
Spinoza to Kant. 
If the life of the world, including human life, is to have a meaning beyond the stretch 
of time, then eternity must enclose time. The American philosopher Josiah Royce (1855-
I 916) develops such a view of the relation of time to eternity. 
Royce's conception of time is similar to that of Husserl. Time is not the time of mathe-
matics, i.e, a series of durationless points. Rather, it is the experience of succession. He 
writes: 
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. . . we not only observe that any antecedent member of the series is over and past 
before the next number comes, but also, and without the least contradiction 
between these two aspects of our total experience, we observe that this whole suc-
cession . .. is present at once to our consciousness . ... 22 
The fact that the serial character of experienced time is also concurrently experienced 
as a unified whole is the key to Royce's theory of the relation of the temporal to the eter-
nal. More specifically, experienced time is, for us, an experience of Will. On the one hand, 
the time-span of the experienced present is a limited one. The successions, the "before" 
and "after," that are held within the unity of the experienced present are relatively few. 
On the other hand, these short successions of present apprehension portend future expe-
riences in which present intentions of Will may be realized and fulfilled. Time is the expe-
rience of yearning for the Other, i.e., that which is beyond any finite realization. But, 
Royce maintains, this Other is not merely an Other, to be followed by some additional 
Other in a serial endlessness. This Other is also Totality. And Totality is the Eternal. 
For, as a fact, in defining time we have already, and inevitably, defined eternity; and 
a temporal world must needs be, when viewed in its wholeness, an eternal world.23 
Again, 
For the goal of every finite life is simply the totality whereof this life, in its finitude, is 
a fragment. When [ seek my own goal, [ am looking for the whole of myself. In so 
far as my aim is the absolute completion of my Selfhood, my goal is identical with 
the whole life of God.24 
Thus, as in fmite experience the duration of the "now" is inclusive of past and future, 
so in the infinite experience every portion of time is simultaneously present. 
. . . [ declare that this same temporal world is, when regarded in its wholeness, an 
Eternal order. And [ mean by this assertion nothing whatever but that the whole 
real content of this temporal order, whether it is viewed from anyone temporal 
instant as past or as present or as future, is at once known, i.e. is consciously experi-
enced as a whole, by the Absolute. 
Now the events of the temporal order . . . are divided, with reference to the point 
of view of any finite Self, into what now is, and what no longer is, and what is to be, 
but is not yet. These same events, however, in so far as they are viewed at once by 
the Absolute, are for such view, all equally present.25 
Thus every portion of time is literally present for God. The temporal world is for God 
a totum simul, which, however, also keeps the order in which events succeed themselves, 
though in finite experience they disappear and are replaced. 
The British philosopher Bernard Bosanquet (1848-1923) objects to Royce's theory of 
eternity, on the grounds that it does not allow for the necessary transformation of finite 
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experiences as included in the divine experience. He gives an example. A man grieves for 
four hours, because he believes that he has offended his friend. At the end of the four 
hours, he realizes that he was mistaken, and his grief is dispelled. Now, the question is: is 
the series of events apprehended by the finite mind apprehended in the exact manner by 
the Infinite Mind? Now, in finite experience the first term, the feeling of anxiety, is modi-
fied by the second term, the feeling of gladness. As the terms are taken up in God's expe-
rience, is the first term, the anxiety, modified? 
If, in the divine experience, i.e., in eternity, the anxiety is not modified, the Divine 
Mind would apprehend only a congeries, a lifeless, meaningless, aggregate. 
If . .. the latter occurrences do not modify the earlier, ... then we have no transfor-
mation, but only a fixed panorama of exactly the same occurrences which form a 
diorama for the man who goes through them. This gives a mere aggregate or con-
geries. Omniscience is then to see in any lapse of successive events nothing more 
than a finite being would see so far as he followed that identical lapse. Surely this 
will not do. 
But suppose, now, that in the higher consciousness, which views the anxiety and glad-
ness all at once, the anxiety is colored by the gladness. This experience is different from 
the finite experience of temporal succession, which is marked, first, by anxiety and, sec-
ond, by gladness. This means, then, that, in the simultaneity of the divine experience, 
there is an experience that is alien to the absolute consciousness. Hence, on Royce's theo-
ry, not all finite experiences would be included in the divine experience. But this conse-
quence, his theory of the Absolute will not permit. 
But neither will it permit the transformation of temporal experiences as they are con-
tained in the Divine Mind. Transformation, even in the higher consciousness, is a process, 
a development, a completion, and this is inconsistent with the static character of the 
Absolute. In short, neither alternative, i.e., that subsequent events do or do not affect pre-
vious events, is allowed for by Royce's theory of eternity. 
It would appear, then, that the respect in which time is included in eternity must be 
one in which process is not excluded from eternity. If time is the experience of process, 
and if time is brought within eternity, then process must be a factor in eternity. 
The third concept of eternity, that it includes time while yet transcending time, may 
perhaps best be defined by reference to the work of Alfred North Whitehead. 
For Whitehead, what he terms "actual entities" are the basic realities of the universe. 
He writes: 
'Actual entities'- also termed 'actual occasions'-are the final real things of which 
the world is made up. There is no going behind actual entities to find anything 
more real. They differ among themselves: God is an actual entity, and so is the 
most trivial puff of existence in far-off empty space. But, though there are gradations 
of importance, and diversities of function, yet in the principles which actually exem-
plifies all are on the same level. The final facts are, all alike, actual entities; and these 
actual entities are drops of experience, complex and interdependent.27 
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Actual entities come into existence through a self-creative process. The process 
involves two factors: an actual entity receives content from an entity, or set of entities, 
whose life is over, and it also receives structure in terms of general characteristics (eternal 
objects). Whitehead calls this process by which events create themselves prehension. 
A prehension is a process of unifying. Accordingly, nature is a process of expansive 
development, necessarily transitional from prehension to prehension. What is 
achieved is thereby passed beyond, but it is also retained as having aspects of itself 
present to the prehensions which lie beyond it. 
Thus nature is a structure of evolving processes. The reality is the process.28 
Thus nature is a flux, the passage of events. There is an interminable flow of successive 
events. Events briefly occur, then pass away into "the dead past." Only when their lives 
are over, do they become content for transfer to newly arising events. Yet, even here, 
there are intimations of immortality and eternity. For, as the above passage indicates, even 
in their death there are aspects of their individuality present in the future course of events. 
The self-constituting process whereby events come into being involves, we have earlier 
indicated, the taking on of structure and pattern. Events are not only a that; they are also a 
what. They are defined in terms of some certain general characteristics. Their definition is 
itself a complex one. On the one hand, the indirect inheritance of pattern by way of the 
transfer of content from events that have perished predisposes the reception of some char-
acteristics. But, on the other hand, the range of possible characteristics, or eternal objects, is 
infinite. Since the emerging event is to a large extent self-creative and thus tends toward 
novelty, there are other characteristics called for. Yet no event can embody all the possible 
characteristics. There must be some selection of eternal objects, made available consistently 
with the self-aim of the emerging event, so as to enable the emergence of the novel occa-
sion. The only agency in this process must be itself an actual entity. It must be an actual 
entity that envisages the eternal objects and serves as the principle of selection, so as to 
make available to the emerging event its relevant characteristics. This actual entity is God. 
Since God envisages the eternal objects, there is, and must be, an eternal aspect of his 
nature. Whitehead calls this the "primordial nature" of God. This aspect of God is his 
absoluteness, his eternity. 
The 'primordial nature' of God is the concrescence of an unity of conceptual feel-
ings, including among their data all eternal objects. The concrescence is directed by 
the subjective aim, that the subjective forms of the feelings shall be such as to con-
stitute the eternal objects into relevant lures of feeling severally appropriate for all 
realizable conditions.29 
Thus the whole process itself, viewed at any stage as a definite limited fact which 
has issued from the creativity, requires a definite entity, already actual among the 
formative elements, as an antecedent ground for the entry of the ideal forms into 
the definite process of the temporal world . . . . God, who is the ground antecedent 
to transition, must include all possibilities of physical value conceptually, thereby 
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holding the ideal forms apart in equal, conceptual realization of knowledge. Thus, as 
concepts, they are grasped together in the synthesis of omniscience . . .. This ideal 
world of conceptual harmonization is merely a description of Cod himself. Thus the 
nature of Cod is the complete conceptual realization of the realm of ideal forms. 
The kingdom of heaven is Cod .. .. Thus Cod is the one systematic, complete fact, 
which is the antecedent ground conditioning every creative act.30 
Thus the eternal Cod is intricately involved in the world process. He is the eternal 
antecedent fact who, from out the harmony of his wisdom, provides the lure for the self-
realization of the events of world process. But he is more. For he takes within himself, in so 
far as the harmony of his nature permits, the events for which he is the lure, the 
antecedent condition. But now the transfer of content is radically different from what 
occurs in the transfer of content from events to events. There, the duration of the emerging 
and new event is itself soon to slip into the irretrievable past, to become data for the future. 
But this does not occur in Cod; Cod has no past. He continues to live as he increasingly 
receives from creature-hood the transfer of content. He is, as it were, protected from per-
ishing, as he undergoes some modification, by reason of his eternal nature, his primordial 
nature. But, notwithstanding this eternity, his nature is yet changed. There is process in 
Cod, process in eternity. This effect, Whitehead calls the "consequent nature" of Cod. 
The 'consequent nature' of Cod is the physical prehension by Cod of the actuali-
ties of the evolving universe. This primordial nature directs such perspectives of 
objectification that each novel actuality in the temporal world contributes such 
elements as it can to a realization in Cod free from inhibitions of intensity by rea-
son of discordance.3 ! 
Now, in the transfer of content from finite actual entities into the consequent nature of 
Cod, not all can be saved. While he exercises "a tender care that nothing be lost,")2 it never-
theless remains that this care is qualified by the import of the phrase, "that can be saved." 
Those discordances that destroy the harmony of the Divine Life cannot be received in Cod's 
inner life. In this respect, there is the transformation of content, as the temporal is received in 
etemity, that Royce's account of the inclusion of the finite in the infinite cannot provide. But 
the transformation goes further: the individuality that is saved in the Divine Life is saved in the 
most comprehensive context of perfection. He is preserved, with undiminished reality, in 
Cod. But, consistent with that individuality, he now lives in the harmony of the divine society. 
The consequent nature of Cod is his judgment on the world. He saves the world 
as it passes into the immediacy of his own life. It is the judgment of a tenderness 
which loses nothing that can be saved. It is also the judgment of a wisdom which 
uses what in the temporal world is mere wreckage)) 
.. . there is ... perfected actuality, in which the many are one everlastingly, without 
qualification of any loss either of individual identity or of completeness of unity. In 
everlastingness, immediacy is reconciled with objective immortality)4 
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Finally there is in God what Whitehead calls the "supe~ective nature" of God. This is 
the phase in the divine nature whereby the content that is provided him from temporal 
entities is made available to the new, emerging entities in the process of the ongoing 
world. If we put this in terms of the lives of personal individuals, their constructive work 
in the world, as it is received in God's everlasting life, is, by his tender care, given back, 
with transformation, to the world. 
The "supe~ective" nature of God is the character of the pragmatic value of his spe-
cific satisfaction qualifying the transcendent creativity in the various temporal 
instances.35 
In the fourth phase [supe~ectl the creative action completes itself. For the perfected 
actuality passes back into the temporal world, and qualifies this world so that each 
temporal actuality includes it as an immediate fact of relevant experience. For the 
kingdom of heaven is with us today. The action of the fourth phase is the love of 
God for the world. It is the particular providence for particular occasions. What is 
done in the world is transformed 36 into a reality in heaven, and the reality in heaven 
passes back into the world. By reason of this reciprocal relation, the love in the 
world passes into the love in heaven, and floods back again into the world. In this 
sense, God is the great companion- the fellow-sufferer who understands . . . . 
Throughout the perishing occasions in the life of each temporal creature, ... is the 
transformation of Itself, everlasting in the Being of God.37 
Whitehead believes that the period from the Hebrew prophets to the death of 
Augustine was an especially significant one in the history of religion. In the chapter, 'The 
New Reformation," of his book, Adventures of Ideas, he says that there are three phases of 
the period. "The first phase is constituted by Plato's publication of his final conviction, 
towards the end of his life, that the divine element in the world is to be conceived as a 
persuasive agency and not as a coercive agency."38 The second phase is the embodiment 
of this idea in the person of Jesus of Nazareth. Whitehead writes of this : 
The essence of Christianity is the appeal to the life of Christ as a revelation of the 
nature of God and of his agency in the world . . .. But there can be no doubt as to 
what elements in the record have evoked a response from all that is best in human 
nature. The Mother, the Child, and the bare manger: the lonely man, homeless and 
self-forgetful, with his message of peace, love, and sympathy: the suffering, the 
agony, the tender words as life ebbed, the final despair: and the whole with the 
authority of supreme victory.39 
The third phase is the intellectual effort to combine Plato's insight with Jesus' life. The 
Christian theologians endeavored, perhaps none too successfully, to bring the etemal into the 
temporal by finding God immanent in Christ and the Holy Spirit. The attempt was aborted, 
Whitehead believes, because, in the final analysis, the theologians refused to follow their own 
initialleadings: they refused to apply to God the conditions that hold for temporal process. 
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The eternal is in time, but, also, time is in the eternal. Time makes a difference in the 
eternal. The Cod who is primordial is also the Cod who is consequent. Charles 
Hartshorne, who has carried Whitehead's thought more explicitly into the domain of 
philosophical theology, argues that what happens in the temporal world does, indeed, 
make a difference to Cod, brings added content to the divine experience. There is, 
Hartshorne says, the absolute nature of Cod, but there is also his relative nature. 
The divine relativity has been largely overlooked in traditional theology. For example, 
Anselm of Canterbury (1033-1 109), following the Creek doctrine of the absolute impas-
sivity of Cod, writes: 
For if thou art passionless, thou dost not feel sympathy; and if thou dost not feel 
sympathy, thy heart is not wretched from sympathy for the wretched; but this is to 
be compassionate. But if thou art not compassionate, whence cometh so great con-
solation to the wretched? ... 
Truly, thou art so in terms of our experience, but thou art not so in terms of thine 
own. For, when thou beholdest us in our wretchedness, we experience the effect of 
compassion, but thou dost not experience the feeling. Therefore, thou art both 
compassionate, because thou dost save the wretched, and spare those who sin 
against thee; and not compassionate, because thou art affected by no sympathy for 
wretchedness.4o 
But it is inconceivable that Cod should take cognizance of our condition and yet not 
appreciate it with feeling. Further, Anselm asks us to believe that, if we respond to the 
divine overture and are saved, this, too, has no affect in the quality of the Divine Life. 
However, the Bible speaks with a truer, richer voice. Surely, it must be said of the eter-
nal One that he is affected in the transaction, of which Isaiah speaks, when the great 
prophet looks forward to the redeeming immanence of Cod in the Savior: 
He is despised and rejected 
of men; a man of sorrows, and ac-
quainted with grief: ... 
Surely he hath borne our 
griefs, and carried our sorrows: yet 
we did esteem him stricken, smitten 
of Cod, and afflicted. 
But he was wounded for our 
transgressions, he was bruised for 
our iniquities: the chastisement of 
our peace was upon him; and with 
his stripes are we healed ... . 
He was oppressed, and he was 
afflicted, yet he opened not his 
mouth: he is brought as a lamb to 
the slaughter, and as a sheep be-
fore her shearers is dumb, so he 
openeth not his mouth.41 
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[f our knowledge of God is dependent upon grace, it is also dependent upon what is 
best in our humanity. And the best in our humanity cannot accept the view that the 
Father of unbounded love stands in an eternal impassivity, unaffected by, unmoved by, 
that divine transaction that supremely brings the eternal into time. Nor is the Father unaf-
fected by the salvation that results from the great work of the Savior: "He shall see the tra-
vail of his soul, and shall be satisfied . . .. " The satisfaction is in heaven: 
And when he cometh home, 
he calleth together his friends 
and neighbors, saying unto 
them. Rejoice with me; for [ 
have found my sheep which was lost. 
I say unto you, that likewise 
joy shall be in heaven over one 
sinner that repenteth . . .. 42 
Hartshorne writes eloquently of all this: 
. . . Cod has nowhere to hide himself from any sorrow or joy whatever, but must 
share in all the wealth and burden of the world. The cross is a sublime and match-
less symbol of this . ... 
Only a mind completely free of selfish prejudice, ready to enter with instant sym-
pathy into all existent forms of experience, to participate without reserve in every 
last fragment of feeling and thought anywhere, and able to harmonize all this vari-
ety of experience into one tolerable aesthetic whole, can constitute the subject of all 
change. Precisely this is also the religious idea of Cod, to whom all hearts are com-
pletely open because his sensitive sympathy is absolute in flexibility.43 
Now, as we have indicated in the opening pages of this work, the scriptures speak of an 
eternity that involves time and a time that involves eternity. The Pauline doxologies lift the 
refrain that sings of "the generations of the ages of the ages," and of "the age of the ages." 
The Hebrew equivalent to the Greek age (aiwv) is tJ~i:l1 . Some have argued this word 
is derived from the root, tJ?~, concealed, which means to veil from sigh~ to conceal. The 
noun suggests a vanishing point, that which is out of mind, that which is in the remote 
past or future. It thus signifies a temporal span of indefinite duration. It is used in the earli-
er Hebrew literature in this restricted sense. 
Only in the later Hebrew scriptures is the plural form, tJ~p~iY, used. The plural is a 
development of the singular, to raise the idea of indefinite duration to the idea of an eter-
nity in which temporality is encompassed. It is found, for example, in Isaiah: 
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But Israel shall be saved in 
the Lord with an everlasting 
salvation: ye shall not be ashamed 
nor confused world without end.44 
The expression everlasting salvation (tJ'r.J~i:v I1~nilJf1) reads, literally, a salvation of ages. The 
phrase translated as world without end is in the Hebrew 'l! 'P?ill'l!. The plural of tJ~ill, i.e., 
tJ'p~ill, is associated twice with the term 'l!. As a noun, the term means terminus, or dura-
tion, in the sense of advance or perpetuity. It may also be used as a preposition, and as such 
it is prefixed to the plural tJ'P~ill . The noun form of the term follows the compound 
term. Thus the phrase translated as world without end is in the Hebrew characterized in 
terms of a doubling of the ideas of terminus and advance in the etemal ages. The expres-
sion in the Hebrew may, then, be translated, to ages of ages. The idea is that the temporal 
ages culminate in and advance in the etemal ages, the ages whose advance is forever 
open. It is thus comparable to the Creek phrase in Ephesians 3 :2 1.45 
The very same duality of meaning is found in the Creek term aimv, or age. Here, too, 
the ideas of time and etemity are intertwined. The word is derived from an obsolete 
primitive noun, aci, which apparently means continued duration. The word means, prop-
erly, an age. The age is a temporal one. But by extension the meaning is advanced to con-
note perpetuity. Thus already the primitive term, aei, suggests the idea of endlessness. 
When the present participle rou, being, is added, to form the term aimv (age), the implied 
connotation is made explicit. Temporality is associated with eternity. This association is 
carried forward in the formation of the word eternal, aimutO~. Thus, by way of its deriva-
tion, the term eternity is associated with the term age, of which itself, as we have just 
observed, carries an implicit connotation of eternity. 
The singular term aimv is found in classical Creek literature. Aristotle speaks of it with 
reference to its implication in world time: 
. . . the sum of existence of the whole heaven, the sum which includes all time 
[Xpovo~] even to infinity, is aeon, taking the name from aci Etvat ("to be everlast-
ingly"), for it is immortal and divine. In dependence on it all other things have their 
existence and their life . .. .<6 
It may very well be defined as life or vital force. Homer writes in this regard: "yet shall 
my life [aimv] long endure" (E1tt OT]pOV aimv DE f..l,Ot aimv £O"O"£'tat). The identification 
is unequivocally indicated in another passage of Homer's, where he says: "and his sweet 
life [aimv] was ebbing away."4? It appears, therefore, that aimv is connected, not only 
with aci, but also with aT]f..l,t, to breathe, to blow, thus denoting that which causes life, or vital 
force. If this be the case, we are here trenching upon the fully developed view that the sin-
gular age, the final and eternal aimv, is the Divine Life. But be that as it may, aimu is now 
generally regarded as connected with aci.. 
This same word aimv is used in the New Testament to indicate things that appear 
to be profoundly antithetical: the eternity of Cod and the duration of the world. Now, 
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belief in creation brings with it a separation of the ideas of time and eternity. Thus the 
New Testament employs aiwv in the sense of the time of the world, and, particularly, 
the end-time of the world. Matthew says that Jesus spoke in parables as a way of dis-
closing "things which have been kept secret from the foundation of the world." The 
Master explains to his disciples that the harvest referred to in "the parable of the tares 
of the field" is "the end of the world" (aiw'Uoc;-age). The margin of the Revised 
Version translates the phrase as it is literally, the consummation of the age ('t11 (JUv't£A.£iq. 
aiw'Uoc;). The word cruv't£A.£t<X, which is in the King James version translated as end, is 
a compound word. It derives from its verb, cruv't£A.£W, which in its turn is a compound 
of the preposition cruv (together with, with) and the verb 't£A.£O) (to end, i.e., to complete). 
In composition, which is the case here, the preposition emphasizes the thought of con-
summation or fulfillment. The end-time, then, is emphatically the time of fulfillment-
the fulfillment of the age in its discharge of the divine purpose in the time of the world. 
There is even here the implicit thought of the supreme age, the eternal age, in which 
the temporal age is brought to its summons in God. Jesus himself voices this: "Then 
shall the righteous shine forth as the sun in the kingdom of their Father."48 Once again 
time and eternity are intertwined. 
There are passages in the New Testament where the singular aiw'U, used to refer to 
the time of the world, is replaced by the plural. Although the plural breaks away from the 
strict emphasis on world-unity, which is strictly the function of the singular, and approach-
es the eternity-formula, the reference is still to the unity of world-time. This use of aiwv is 
found in Hebrews 9:26: 
For then must he often have 
suffered, since the foundation of 
the world: but now once in the 
end of the world hath he 
appeared, to put away sin by the 
sacrifice of himself. 
The phrase the end of the world is in the Greek, cruv't£A.£iq. 'twv aicOvO)v, and means 
literally, consummation of the ages. Here the plural is used, not to denote eternity, but the 
dispensations within the unitary age of world-time, through which the divine purpose of 
redemption is successively realized. The primary age is still the unitary age of world-time, 
which holds within its embrace the several lesser ages. 
The singular form of the term is also used in the New Testament to designate eternity. 
Jesus declares to his disciples that he is " .. . the living bread which came down from heav-
en: if any man eat of this bread he shall live forever ... ".49 The word forever is in the 
Greek the phrase £ic; 'tOY aiwva, unto the age. Here the age is the eternal age. Now, the 
singular form, which primarily denotes world-time, is often strengthened by adding to it 
the singular genitive of aicOv. The Epistle to the Hebrews speaks of the Son: 
But unto the Son he saith, 
Thy throne, 0 God, is for ever 
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and ever: a sceptre of righteousness 
is the sceptre of thy kingdom.50 
The phrase for ever and for ever is £~ 'tov airova 'tOll airovo<;, which reads unto the age of 
the age. 
There is a further development in the use of the term, airov, to express the idea of 
eternity. It consists in associating the plural of airov with the singular. This is employed in 
the passage noted at the beginning of this work. Ephesians 3 :21 reads: "throughout all ages, 
world without end," E~ redoUt; 'tat; YEVEat; 'tOll airovot; trov airov(Ov, "unto all generations 
of the age of the ages. " 
The phrase is a remarkable one. It contains two formulae. One formula expresses the 
idea of eternity, or endless continuance, in terms of YEVEd, generations. The other formula 
expresses the same idea in terms of airov and airovEt;, age and ages. The phrase is pecu-
liar, in that the two formulae are conjoined and the singular, age, is used in the latter for-
mula in connection with the plural of the term. Previously, as in Hebrews I :8, the singular 
is used to express eternity, but it is not associated with the plural. 
The first formula expressing the idea of eternity, cit; redoat; 'tat; YEVEat; (unto all gener-
ations), places the generations in the singular aiffiv, the one and single age of eternity. And 
the second formula places the plural airov£<;, or ages, within one and single aiffiv, or age, 
of eternity. The use of the singular has the effect of defining eternity as the one eternal fact 
of the living God. It has the further effect of declaring that the ages within the one eternal 
age are not merely abstract times, but the times of countless generations who, through 
redemption, are enclosed in the eternal divine embrace. The emphasis is on the individuals 
who are redeemed in God. In the one, eternal fact of the Divine Life, there is, indeed, in 
the language of Whitehead, " . .. the phase of perfected actuality, in which the many are 
one everlastingly, without qualification of any loss either of individual identity or of com-
pleteness of unity. In everlastingness, immediacy is reconciled with objective immortality."si 
But there is yet a further, and final, development of the eternity formula . This develop-
ment consists in the formation of the double plural. It is the most complete expression for 
eternity that the New Testament writers employ. It is used only in the New Testament. 
The formula is the one, noted earlier, found in Galatians 1:5: "for ever and ever," £~ 
'tOut; airovat; 'trov airov(Ov, unto the ages of the ages. Here eternity is defined as "ages 
upon ages." If, now, we combine the two forms of the eternity formula, i.e., Ephesians 
3:2 I and Galatians 1:5, we get the result that the one eternal age is, instead of a static 
one, the age of movement and life. "But the Lord is the true God, he is the living God, 
and an everlasting king ... "S2 Eternity is no abstract thing; it is the actuality of the living 
God. Eternity is the supreme and comprehensive experience of God. And the Christian 
promise is that the time that is the form of our present experience shall, without essential 
loss, be embraced within the life of Him who ever liveth. 
How shall companionship with the Divine Life be interpreted? But before we consider 
this, the final subject with which this work deals, a brief consideration of an allied ques-
tion should be made. 
We have seen, in connection with our consideration of Whitehead's theory, that God 
in his primordial eternity is associated with finite events in two respects: he receives into 
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himself content derived from finite events, and, secondly, he makes available the content 
to the ongoing world of finite events. There is thus development in the divine nature and 
an offering from that nature to the future of the world. [n this last phase, there is divine 
enactment in the actual world. This enactment, we may say, brings etemity into time. 
The Christian conception of Cod differs in certain essential aspects from Whitehead's 
conception. This is particularly so with respect to the divine enactment that creates the 
critical juncture of eternity and time. For Christianity that enactment is Jesus Christ in his-
tory. We may say that this personal event is within Cod's eternal envisagement. For of this 
man it is written that he is "the Lamb slain from the foundation of the world,"53 that he 
"verily was foreordained before the foundation of the world, but was manifest in these 
last times . .. . "54 He "was manifest in these last times": 
And the Word was made 
flesh, and dwelt among us, (and 
we beheld his glory, the glory 
as of the only begotten of the 
Father,) full of grace and truth.55 
But to return to the question: how shall companionship with the supreme experience 
be interpreted? There are two answers to this question. First, it cannot be understood in 
conceptually clear or precise terms. John writes, "Beloved, now are we the sons of Cod, 
and it doth not yet appear what we shall be. "56 We know our present state as children of 
Cod, but we cannot comprehend the state of our future glory. 
But as it is written, Eye hath 
not seen, nor ear heard, neither 
have entered into the heart of 
man, the things which Cod hath 
prepared for them that love him.57 
Second, there is even now some indication of the nature of our participation in heav-
en's glory. Paul states this where he writes: "For now we see through a glass, darkly .. . : 
Now [ know in part."5B What this signifies is that our knowledge of the future is, and must 
be, symbolic and metaphorical. The phrase "For now we see through a glass, darkly" can 
be translated as either "For we see at present by means of a mirror in a riddle" or "For we 
see now through a mirror, in (the fashion) of a riddle." The mirror is a reflecting mirror. It is 
not of the order of a glass through which one looks. The word translated as "mirror" is 
eO"o1t'tpov, which means "reflector." The adverb "darkly" is in the Creek a prepositional 
phrase, EV a.iviy~a.n, which means "in a riddle." What we know are a few rays of truth. 
And these are not given directly, but only as reflections. 
What the future shall be, then, is, as the term suggests, an enigma. But the enigma, 
given through the medium of human thought and language, indicates, even now, some-
thing of the reality to which it refers. What we do know is, as Paul says, that our reflected 
glimpse of the realities of heaven will one day give way to direct and immediate appre-
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hension: "but then face to face: .. . but then I shall know even as also I am known." It is 
remarkable that the word "know" is not the same word where Paul says that he now 
knows "in part," but that in the future he will "know even as also I am known." His partial 
knowledge is yw05crKOl, which is the approximate knowledge of the learner. The knowl-
edge that he anticipates is illumination. The word is £1ttyv05crof.Lat (know-welD: "But then I 
shall know-well, as also I was well-known." Paul is saying that, as his Lord knew him well 
when he was converted, so in such fashion he will know in heaven. Then it shall be, not 
so much that we know Cod, but rather that we are known of Cod. 
Paul's discussion of this topic is formulated in conceptual terms, terms that have to do 
with knowledge. The terms are, to be sure, but human terms. But there are also terms 
that are symbolic and metaphorical. The New Testament employs these terms in its effort 
to throw light on the future that awaits the children of Cod. 
Now, we may experience some hesitancy to accept the view that our knowledge is 
symbolic. This is especially so in our time when exact science reigns so predominantly. 
We fear that, while science yields knowledge and truth, so it is widely believed, religion 
does no such thing with respect to the declarations of faith. 
However, there is here a great confusion. For science itself is symbolic. The construc-
tions and theories of empirical science are the symbolic forms with which the attempt is 
made to collate and systematize our perceptual encounter with the world. Were we to 
ask the question, "are these constructions and theories 'literally' true-true of the world as 
it 'really' is"? we would ask an irrational and unanswerable question. We would be asking 
for a knowledge that transcends the very conditions of knowledge. That is but nonsense. 
The inescapable fact is that we are here, as in all forms of thought and discourse, confined 
to our " community of subjective form."59 
The scientific symbol is an operational symbol, i.e., its reference is always to the percep-
tual. The religious symbol is an intuitive symbol, i.e., its function is to receive the sensible 
and intuitible and then mould that content so as to apply it to the non-sensible and non-
intuitible. The process is one in which the symbol leads into the reality symbolized and in 
so doing transcends itself in insight. 
Now, it is in the Book of Revelation that this is done par excellence. The writer draws 
his images from the range of human experience: from heaven and earth, from darkness 
and light, from sun and moon, from fountains and rivers and seas, from country and city, 
from jewels and gold, from tears and sorrows, from joy and gladness, from death and life, 
and from bride-hood and the lamb of the field. Yet all these images give way to insight, if 
we will but wait and let the imagery lead us on and upward. Linger for a moment. You 
will see neither darkness nor sunlight, for there is no pause in the activities of daylight 
time and there is no need of borrowed light. You will see no sea of sorrow and unrest, for 
now they are buried in the depth of the past. But you will see the eternal fountains of 
grace, "the throne of God and the Lamb," from which flows the life-giving river. You will 
see on its banks the trees of life that yield the fruits of sustenance and bear the leaves of 
healing. You will see the city whose streets are of pure gold, upon which its people walk 
the golden ways of peace and happiness. You will see no tears, for these streams of sad-
ness throughout humanity's long history are wiped away in the divine gift of serenity. You 
will hear no sound of mourning or crying. 
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And I John saw the holy city, 
new Jerusalem, coming down 
from Cod out of heaven, prepared 
as a bride adorned for her husband. 
"As a bride adorned for her husband." Here the imagery speaks of the intimacy of com-
munion, of the reality of the sharing of lives in the Divine Life. This is the final harmony. 
NOTES 
And I beheld, and 10, in the 
midst of the throne . . . stood 
a lamb as it had been slain ... 
And he came and took the 
book out of the right hand of 
him that sat upon the throne. 
And they sung a new song, 
saying, Thou art worthy to take 
the book, and to open the seals 
thereof: for thou wast slain, and 
hast redeemed us to Cod by 
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